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Accounting for war risk costs: management accounting change at Guinness during 
World War 1.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores management accounting change at the St. James’s Gate Brewery of 
Arthur Guinness & Sons Ltd brought about by the effects of World War 1 (WW1). In 
particular, how additional war risk costs were accounted for internally is revealed. Using 
organizational routines as a theoretical backdrop, new management accounting practices are 
interpreted. These new practices allocated war risk costs incurred by head office (in Dublin) 
to other parts of the company. The key role of existing management accounting routines in 
the formation of new routines is also revealed. Although WW1 was an exogenous driver of 
change, endogenous change also featured as existing practices guided the creation/adaptation 
of routines. In essence, accountants within the Guinness Company drew upon their existing 
knowledge to deal with a new and complex scenario (i.e. WW1). Thus, change and stability 
went hand-in-hand. Although change did occur, it was moderate and more adaptive, which 
signifies existing accounting routines were strong and adaptable to major drivers of change 
such as WW1.  
 
 
Key words: World War I, war risk costs, Guinness, accounting change. 
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Introduction 
 
Arthur Guinness started to brew ale (and later porter) at the St. James’s Gate Brewery, Dublin 
in 1759 (Lynch and Vaizey, 1960, p.70). At that time, he signed a 9,000 year lease for an 
initial £100 and an annual rent of £45 (ibid, p.70). The brewery still stands at the site, 
producing stout and beer for global markets. Arthur Guinness and Sons Ltd (hereafter 
Guinness) was floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1886. The business records of 
Guinness are available at the St. James’s Gate site. While more detail on the nature of the 
archive is given later, the records are a treasure trove of both company and Irish business 
history. Records date from 1759, but more detailed records are available from the time of 
flotation in 1886. Records covering the period of World War 1 (WW1) are available, and 
these are utilised here.  
 
There were general effects of WW1 on business at Guinness, and these are briefly noted to 
provide context. As stated by Dennison & MacDonagh, “the popular wartime slogan 
‘business as usual’ applied in many ways to Guinness” (1998, p.149). However they also note 
as the war progressed the company was eventually affected by government war-time 
restrictions. In particular, restrictions on the purchase of some materials and on the quantity 
and gravity of beer effected sales (Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, pp. 150-154) - the latter 
restriction on beer gravity continued to affect sales into the 1920’s (ibid, p.161). The Output 
of Beer (Restriction) Act 1916 restricted the output of beer in the United Kingdom to “below 
a rate of 26,000,000 barrels per annum” (Bird, 1918, p.1). The Act operated as follows: 
 
Brewers could choose whether they would brew, during the year to March 31st 1917, 
15% of their total output for the year ended March 31st 1916, or 30% of their total 
output for the year ended September 30th 1914. A limit was then fixed in the case of 
each brewery for each quarter separately while the Act remained in force. This limit is 
known as the maximum barrelage, and if exceeded in any quarter, renders the brewer 
liable to a penalty of £100, in addition to a further penalty of £2 per barrel brewed in 
excess (Bird, 1918, pp. 1-2). 
 
The Output of Beer (Restriction) Act 1916 continued in force until August 1st 1919 
(Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, p.153). At the same time, excise duty per barrel increased. 
The duty per barrel was 7s 9d (38.75p in modern terms) from the 1899/1900 tax year through 
to the 1913/14 tax year1. The Finance Act 1914 (Session 2) increased the duty to £1 3s 0d 
(115p) on 18th November 1914, an almost threefold increase. This increased successively to 
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£5 by 1920/21, which the Company Secretary referred to as “the unthought-of burden of 100s 
per Standard Barrel” (cited in Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, p.150). In addition to excise 
duty increases and output restrictions, the original gravity of the beer was reduced to a 
maximum of 1036 by the Output of Beer (Restriction) Act. For Guinness, this implied a 
decrease from 1058 for porter (Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, p.153). Despite the increased 
duty, reduced gravity and output restrictions, Guinness maintained profits in line with the rate 
of inflation during the war years (Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, p.151). However, longer 
term effects of these years were apparent in declining sales in the post war years (see 
Dennison & MacDonagh, 1998, pp.160 -175). 
 
WW1 has been cited as a catalyst for change in many aspects of society. For example, 
medicine (Bennett, 1990) and education (Mehaffy, 1987) both experienced change in 
practices. Accounting too experienced change (see later), and as noted by Loft (1986), WW1 
invigorated cost accounting. Although Guinness was affected in general business terms by 
WW1 as outlined above, this paper focuses on how the war affected costs, and in turn, how 
this affected management accounting practices at the company. How the accounting 
department accounted for (new) war risk costs on stock-in-transit, stock-in-trade and 
shipment of materials forms the main thrust of the research. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of extant literature on 
management accounting change in a historical (including WW1) and contemporary context. 
The contemporary literature will highlight works on organizational routines, which are drawn 
upon as a theoretical underpinning. In particular, works by Feldman and Pentland (2003), 
Pentland (2011) and Bapuji et al. (2012) are drawn upon. Details of the archival records at 
Guinness are then given, and the methods used outlined. The research is based mainly on this 
primary archival source, with some use of secondary data sources such as the official 
corporate history, by Dennison and MacDonagh (1998). Drawing on these sources, how 
WW1 brought about change in the accounting department is detailed. The change will then 
be discussed drawing on concepts of organizational routines.  
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Extant literature: management accounting change in a historical context; management 
accounting and WW1 
 
Management accounting change 
The study of organisational (and accounting) change is a complex task for researchers, but 
several approaches have been used in extant accounting literature. Briefly, we could say there 
are three broad ways to study change; 1) a classical perspective (see for example, Lewin, 
1951); 2) a contingency approach (see for example, Burns and Stalker, 1961; Donaldson, 
1987); and 3) a consulting approach (see for example Kanter, 1983). These approaches stem 
from organisational theory, typically adopt a positivistic methodology and pay less attention 
to the subjective dimensions of change. Pettigrew suggests that research on organisational 
change which is “acontextual, ahistorical and aprocessual” will yield inadequate explanations 
(1985, p. 15). According to Pettigrew what is needed is to “go beyond the analysis of change 
and begin to theorise about changing” (1985, p. 15). Pettigrew insists change should be 
viewed as a process rather than a static event, where a process can explain: “how the 
possibilities and limitations of change ... are influenced by history ..., relationships between 
interest groups in and outside the firm [and] mobilisation of support within the power 
structure” (1985, p. 24). Pettigrew (1987) later developed his ideas into a framework that has 
been used to guide research on organisational change, suggesting that content, process and 
both inner and outer context are essential dimensions to be explicitly considered. Content 
refers to the portion of an organisation experiencing change. Process refers to the “actions, 
reactions and interactions of the various interested parties, as they seek to move the firm from 
its present to future state” (1987, p. 658). He later clarified his meaning of process as “a 
sequence of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time and in 
context” (1997, p. 338). Importantly, this would seem to suggest time and history are central 
to any processual analysis. Dawson (2003) also presents a processual framework of 
organisational change similar to that put forward by Pettigrew. His contribution comprises 
three main components, namely: (1) context; (2) substance; and, (3) politics. Dawson’s 
framework assumes there is no single notion or account of change - multiple subjective 
accounts and stories of change are possible (2003, p. 10). Dawson also emphasises the 
subjective nature of processual research; universal laws are not sought (2003, p. 86), rather 
the emphasis is on interpretation and meaning (2003, p. 87). 
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The approaches to studying change mentioned above are typical of the study of 
organisational change in general. Some accounting scholars have drawn on them, and in 
particular a processual view on change. As this study focuses on internal accounting at 
Guinness, a brief review of the study of accounting change in the management accounting 
literature follows. As noted by Van der Stede (2011), the study of management accounting 
change is hardly a new phenomenon, and varying approaches have been used. First, several 
institutional approaches have been adopted to analyse management accounting practices. A 
number of Old Institutional Economics informed studies have provided evidence of how 
management accounting practices can change, although they exhibit a taken-for-granted 
nature (see for example Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Coad and Cullen, 2006; 
Lukka, 2007; Quinn, 2014; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Soin et al., 2002). New 
Institutional Sociology has also been adopted to explain management accounting change in 
response to external influences such as political pressures, regulatory changes and cultural 
factors (see for example, Collier, 2001; Modell, 2003; Nor-Aziah & Scapens, 2007; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2006). Several studies using institutional phenomena such as rules and 
routines have also been undertaken (see for example, Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Quinn, 2011; Van der Steen 2011, 2009). Second, Structuration Theory has been used by 
several researchers to analyse change and stability in accounting systems. Recent examples 
include work by Coad and Herbert (2009) and Jack & Kholeif (2008), but as described by 
Englund et al. (2011), structuration theory has been used in accounting research for the past 
25 years or so, dating back to Roberts & Scapens (1985). Third, Actor Network Theory has 
also been used to study management accounting change, although less so than structuration or 
institutional approaches. Some examples include Alcouffe et al. (2008), Dechow & 
Mouritsen (2005) and Lowe (2000)2. From an accounting history perspective, the 
contribution of Littleton (1933) to understanding accounting change is also worthy of 
mention. In Accounting Evolution to 1900, Littleton presents a comprehensive story of how 
accounting evolved over time i.e. as a process. However, Littleton (1933) focuses more on 
financial accounting, the double entry system and external societal factors that stimulated 
change (see Napier, 2009).  
 
This study focuses on management accounting practices within a single company at a 
particular time in history. Old Institutional Economics (OIE) thus provides a useful 
underpinning. OIE rejects the neo-classical economics assumptions of rational economic man 
and equilibrium-based theorising. Instead, it assumes actors should not be treated as “given” 
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(Hodgson, 1998) and that individuals’ tastes and preferences should be assumed as socially 
conditioned. Furthermore, OIE holds that individuals’ tastes and preferences should be 
analysed for their influence on action and behaviour. In particular, it is argued that 
institutional phenomena such as rules, norms and routines can impact tastes and preferences 
(Hodgson, 1988) and, as noted above, several studies of management accounting change have 
drawn upon concepts from OIE.  
 
The concept of organizational routines in particular is used here to interpret accounting 
change within Guinness during WW1. Thus, some elaboration on the nature of routines is 
necessary. Burns & Scapens (2000) is often cited as a starting point by management 
accounting researchers who adopt routines to explore management accounting change (and 
indeed stability). A starting assumption of the OIE-based Burns & Scapens (2000) framework 
is that management accounting change can be interpreted using phenomena such as routines 
(and rules). Burns & Scapens defined routines as “the way things are done” (2000, p. 5). The 
picture painted by them is one of slow, longer-term, evolutionary change over an extended 
period of time. Although they note change can come about through internal organizational 
processes, they argue that revolutionary change is more likely to stem from external sources3. 
In recent years, the concept of organizational routines has received much attention in the 
organizational literature in particular. As noted by Pentland et al. (2010, p. 917), we are “still 
struggling with how to conceptualise, observe and compare one of our most basic kinds of 
phenomena: organizational routines”. Although the term “organizational routine” was first 
mentioned by Stene (1940), Pentland (2011, pp. 280 - 281) brings together much previous 
research, defining organizational routines as comprising four components: 
 
1. Routines are repetitive.  
2. A recognisable pattern of action occurs. Each performance of a routine may vary from 
the previous performance, but a general recognisable pattern is discernible. 
3. Actions are interdependent, indicating several inter-related “steps” in the performance 
of a routine. 
4. Multiple actors are involved.  
 
Based on these components, routines are presented as a crucial element of organizational life 
and a key building block for stable organizational practices over time (c.f. Burns & Scapens, 
2000). Although routines are often associated with stability4, they are also a source of change 
as suggested by Feldman & Pentland (2003). Feldman & Pentland (2003) provide a 
conceptualization of routines which always have potential for change (at each performance) 
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but where an underlying relatively stable understanding of the routine remains in the minds of 
actors. They achieve this stability/change duality through two dimensions of organizational 
routines, namely: (1) the ostensive; and, (2) the performative (ibid 2003, p. 101). The 
ostensive dimension (hereafter ostensive routine) “may have a significant tacit component” 
which moulds the perception of what the routine is, “may be codified as a standard 
procedure” and “may exist as a taken-for-granted norm”. The performative dimension 
(hereafter performative routine) is “the specific action(s) taken by people […] when engaged 
in an organizational routine” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 102) “at specific times, in 
specific places” (Pentland & Feldman, 2008, p. 286).  
 
The four components of organizational routines provided by Pentland (2011) do provide a 
usable basis for accounting (and other) researchers to determine, for example how routines 
are formed, how and why they remain stable and how/if they change. These four components 
will be used here, and more detail is provided on the precise methods used later. Briefly here, 
how new and/or changed accounting practices came about in Guinness as a result of WW1 
will be interpreted through the lens of organizational routines. Extracting routines from 
archival material does present some issues, and these are detailed later. 
 
Management Accounting and WWI 
Some studies of accounting (including management accounting) in the context of WW1 are 
evident in the extant literature – both in general accounting/business literature and accounting 
history literature. While it is not intended to give an exhaustive review, a brief overview of 
literature follows to give a flavour of research undertaken thus far, and effects of WW1 on 
accounting. 
 
In a paper focusing mainly on financial accounting, Gallhofer & Haslam (1991) note the 
effects of WW1 on the public perception of accounting in Germany. Prior to the war, despite 
some secrecy regulations, accounting in Germany was perceived as “a means of ensuring a 
fair and ‘conservative’ representation which was objective in nature” (ibid p.513). During the 
war, the German state realised that higher profits of private firms involved in the war effort 
might meet with public disapproval. Thus, German firms - such as Daimler, as cited by 
Gallhofer & Haslam, (1991) – created secret (i.e. non-published) reserves to disguise extra 
profits from supplying war-time goods and equipment to the German states. The “Daimler 
Scandal” became public in March 1918, with German newspapers providing detail of war-
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profiteering and fraudulent costing and pricing (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991: pp. 504-509). 
The end result of this and similar accounting in other German firms was that accounting 
carried “a negative connotation” and “was mistrusted and perceived as a mechanism for 
hiding immoral profit” (Gallhofer & Haslam 1991: p.513).  
 
Boyns and Edwards note that many cost accounting practices came under closer scrutiny 
during WW1 in the United Kingdom (Boyns & Edwards, 1998). For example, costing 
systems were developed to help firms focus on cost control. Restrictions on trade and some 
raw materials increased costs in general, implying an increased emphasis on tracing product 
costs (McWatters & Foreman, 2005). Other reported effects of WW1 include an increased 
role for women in accounting departments (Black, 2006). Additionally some literature, notes 
the legacy of WW1 on accounting. For example, the aftermath of WW1 and its effects on the 
German economy is well known. One such effect was a relatively unstable currency, and this 
in turn had effected accounting and decision-making (Kobrak, 2002). As noted by Kobrak 
(2002), the result was that foreign exchange management became a feature of German 
businesses such as Schering AG. Thus, management and management accountants now found 
dealing with foreign exchange risks and challenges part of their role.  
 
There is also literature which notes the development of management (or cost) accounting in 
and around the time of WW1. While there is some debate in the literature on her work (see 
Edwards & Boyns, 2013), Loft (1986) argues that cost accounting in the United Kingdom 
was invigorated by government efforts to keep costs of the war effort under control. As Loft 
(1986) notes, a change to Defence of the Realm Act, 1916, forced firms to track costs of 
production, as these were to be used to determine the price of items required for the war - 
many of which had no normal market price. These effective price controls integrated cost 
accounting into the accounting profession (Armstrong, 1987), which ultimately culminated in 
the formation of the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants (ICWA) in March 1919. 
Additionally, as noted by Fleischman & Tyson (2000), Loft (1986) and Marriner (1980), the 
Ministry of Munitions used two methods to attain costs: 1) engineering methods/records-
based costs, or 2) comparative costs of 200 nationalised factories who maintained detailed 
cost records. These methods were used by government employed investigators to control 
costs during WW1. This focus on cost records by the Ministry “forced all governmental 
contractors, many of whom had never attended to costing issues, to establish accounting 
systems that provided the data demanded by the investigating teams” (Fleischman & Tyson, 
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2000). As noted by Marriner however, “if the Ministry of Munitions had any major and 
widespread influence on private industry’s costing systems, this had long since been 
dissipated” (1980, p.140). While there is debate on whether or not British management/cost 
accounting was in a good or poor state pre WW1, (see Edwards & Boyns, 2013; Fleischman 
& Tyson, 2000), the war at least focused attention on how cost accounting was done (Loft, 
1986) and shaped the development of management accounting in Europe (Shields, 1998). 
But, as noted by Edwards & Boyns (2013, p. 190), there is some difficultly in assessing the 
impact of WW1 on cost accounting, as there are still insufficient studies of accounting 
practice encompassing this time period. 
 
The above is by no means an exhaustive review of literature, and there are other works which 
describe the prevalence (or otherwise) of management accounting techniques from the late 
1880’s to the outbreak of war in 1914 – see Edwards and Boyns (2013: pp. 167-203) for a 
useful summary of this literature5. This literature on costing during WW1 tends to focus on 
certain sectors – namely those more directly affected by wartime legislation – such as “coal, 
iron and steel, engineering and shipbuilding, electrical manufacturing, chemical, cotton, 
woollen, worsted and clothing production6” (Marriner, 1980, p.140; see also Edwards and 
Boyns, 2013, pp. 187-192). Further research into the workings of management accountants in 
firms during the war period in other sectors is less common. A reason for this may be the lack 
of sufficiently detailed archival material. For this study, the Guinness archive does not pose 
such an issue and the next section sets out how the archive was used. 
 
Methods – using the archival records at Guinness 
This study utilises the records of the Guinness Company archive from the WW1 years. The 
archival records extend from 1759 to date, with a 30 year hold on document release. 
According to Scott (1990), the quality of archival documents can be assessed according to 
four criteria, as depicted in Table 1.  
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Authenticity – is the evidence genuine and of 
unquestionable origin 
Documents were examined at the archive 
and can be verified as being of the Guinness 
company. 
Credibility – is the evidence free from error. The records examined were internal reports, 
board memoranda and other written 
correspondence between managers and 
accountants at St. James’s Gate and 
locations in the United Kingdom. Such 
records are a credible source. 
Representativeness –is the evidence typical 
of its kind. 
Some records examined are specific to a 
period of time and particular events. Some 
are thus non-typical to the organisation. 
Other records are typical of normal 
accounting records, and similar to those 
described by Quinn (2014).  
Meaning – is the evidence clear and 
comprehensible 
The vast majority of documents examined 
were typed, giving excellent clarity. 
Documents were also typically signed, filed 
with a sequence number and contained cross 
references to other documents. 
 
Table 1 – quality of archival material at Guinness 
 
The archive retains many records which are reflective of what Scott (1990, pp. 81-82) terms 
recurrent, regular and special administrative routines. Recurrent records are a necessary part 
of the daily operations of an organization; regular records that are those that are regularly 
produced, but not an essential element of daily operations; special records are those which are 
reflective of ad-hoc situations and requests. Recurrent and special records were the primary 
document type used for this study. The primary records used here were the Chief 
Accountant’s papers for the WW1 period, and in particular a file entitled “War Risk 
Insurance”. This file extends to approximately 300 pages and was opened on November 5th 
1914. A separate file within the Chief Accountants papers entitled “Aircraft Risk Insurance” 
was also examined – this file extends to approximately 150 pages. Board minutes were also 
examined, as well as Board memoranda. The latter were particularly useful in revealing new 
policies and practices, which were typically more mundane matters than those contained 
within the monthly Board meeting minutes. The above mentioned files were explored in 
detail and photographed digitally as required.  
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As noted earlier, organizational routines will be drawn upon to interpret if/how management 
accounting practices changed as a result of WW1 at Guinness. The next section reveals that 
some new accounting practices were introduced to account for war risk costs. Such new 
practices can be explored through the lens of organizational routines – for example, 1) how 
existing routines influence new routines, 2) if the new practices are routines according to 
Pentland (2011), and 3) if routines changed or if stability prevailed. Quinn (2014) provides a 
useful method of using archival records to study the formation of, and change to, 
organizational routines. As noted by Quinn (2014), Johansson & Siverbo (2009) argue that 
routines cannot be observed – although we may be able to observe a performative routine as 
described by Feldman & Pentland (2003). Here, as archival records are used, we arguably 
cannot observe routines at all. What we can observe are artefacts of routines (Johansson & 
Siverbo, 2009). Artefacts are a “physical manifestation of the organizational routine” 
(Pentland & Feldman, 2008, p. 289), which typically implies they are reports, symbols, signs 
or some other piece of work typically created by humans7.  
 
Quinn (2014) details methods to use archival artefacts to determine how routines (and rules) 
are formed in organizations, and is drawn upon here. A focus is given to artefacts that reflect 
action i.e. artefacts of performative routines as defined by Feldman & Pentland (2003). Thus, 
ledgers, reports, memoranda and other documents may be reflective of new or changed 
accounting routines. Through these artefacts, the four essential components of organizational 
routines (see Pentland, 2011) can be established to determine if in fact accounting change 
became routinised. These artefacts also reflect the ostensive routine, as they reflect what 
actors drew upon to form new routines, or to change existing routines. According to Bapuji et 
al. (2012) artefacts are a type of intermediary – something which transmits the intentions of 
one actor to another. They also propose that routines can be termed strong when the 
intermediary clearly transmits the intentions from one actor to another, and suggest a strong 
routine is more likely to be performed as expected across many iterations. As will be revealed 
later in the discussion section, the term strong routine may be particularly appropriate to 
describe some of the management/cost accounting routines at Guinness. 
 
Accounting for war risk costs  
 
The location of the St. James’s Gate Brewery, in Dublin, implied it was largely immune to 
the physical impact of WW1. However, from 1886 to the WW1 period, on average 30% of its 
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output was sold outside Ireland. The majority was shipped by steamer to ports in England, 
Wales and Scotland for onward shipping and bottling. These shipments were at risk from 
German U-boats during WW1, and one steamer, the W.M. Barkley was torpedoed and sunk 
off the Kish Lighthouse in the Irish Sea on October 12th, 19178. Five of the 12 crew perished. 
This shipping risk was noted early on by management and accountants at Guinness. And, 
evidence from the archive (see below) shows that the company actively accounted for war 
risk costs from November 1914. 
 
Having described the concepts drawn upon for this study in the previous section, we now 
detail new and changed practices in the Accounting Department at Guinness brought about 
due to WW1. The story begins shortly after the outbreak of war. At this time, it was evident 
that the Accounting Department at the St. James’s Gate Brewery played a key role in 
managing the war risks for the company in general. In particular, it played a typical head-
office type role in managing war risk insurance for the companies Trade Stores (or depots) 
and subsequently charging these costs to the stores (see later). The Trade Stores where 
wholly-owned and staffed by Guinness, and at the outbreak of WW1 were located in London, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Glasgow, Bristol, Cardiff and Birmingham9. It 
was the movement of stout from Dublin to these stores which raised initial concerns at St. 
James’s Gate shortly after the outbreak of war in July 1914. 
 
Early war risk costs and the role of accounting 
The first mention of war risk and any associated costs appears to have been a discussion 
between the Board at St. James’s Gate Brewery and Lord Iveagh10 on September 3rd, 1914. A 
Board memorandum titled “Matters discussed with Lord Iveagh” on this date includes 
mention of the “Question of becoming our own Marine Insurers”. The Board proposed to 
Lord Iveagh that “we would open a special marine account ourselves”. Lord Iveagh’s 
response was “it was a question that we might with wisdom take up for consideration”. In 
essence, this discussion (which is not detailed to a great extent in the memorandum) was 
attempting to ascertain if it were more cost effective to self-insure rather than pay additional 
marine insurance costs on goods and raw materials shipped between Dublin and various ports 
in England, Scotland and Wales. 
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On November 5th, 1914, a Board memorandum summarised how the discussions at board 
level and with Lord Iveagh translated into new accounting procedures. In effect, the company 
decided to self-insure against war risk. The following extract outlines the procedure: 
 
What is proposed is as follows: A War Risk Insurance Fund will be opened. This will 
be put in credit to the extent of £10,000. The putting of the fund in credit would really 
be little more than cross entries in our books, as no actual cash would of course pass. 
The Account would be liable to pay interest on the funds placed at its disposal at our 
ordinary rate vis. 3% and would be debited with this amount. It would be credited, 
however, with all premiums which we would have paid to underwriters for insuring 
Malt and Beer on the Irish Channel, and Beer forwarded to London. 
 
A War Risk file entitled “S/129, War Risk Insurance” was also opened on November 5th, 
1914, and on this date a telegraph was set by C.E. Sutton (Asst. Managing Director, St. 
James’s Gate) to T.H. Peyton at the Bristol trade stores containing the following query: 
 
We should be glad if you would ascertain for us in Bristol and Cardiff at what rate we 
could insure our Store stout-in-transit against war risk at the present time. Is the rate a 
standard one of a matter of bargaining? Does it vary week by week, and if so, what 
means do we have of ascertaining the fluctuation. We only require you to find out this 
information and do not wish any actual steps taken11.  
 
A similarly worded telegraph was also sent on the same day to Trade Stores in Lloyds 
Avenue (London), Liverpool, Glasgow and Manchester. The responses received over the 
following week or so are summarised in Table 2. The replies show rates to cover goods 
varying from 2/612 (12.5p) in Bristol to 7/6 (37.5p) in London. 
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Store  Date Response (summarised) 
Bristol Nov 9th, 1914  Messrs Henry Riseley and Sons, Bristol – offering a 
floating policy up to £50,000 value of goods for a 
premium of 2/6 per Cent.  
 Rate available for 1 week 
 Minimum war risk 
 No other Agent prepared to accept business except 
on an individual consignment. 
Lloyds Avenue, 
London. 
Nov 7th, 1914  At present, rate is about 7/6 per Cent 
 No question of bargaining 
 Recommends an open policy based on monthly 
shipments of stout from Dublin 
Liverpool Nov 9th, 1914  Present rate of 5/0 per Cent to cover all war risks 
 Quotation valid until December 31st, 1914 
Glasgow Nov 7th, 1914  At present, brokers are shy of taking war risks on 
goods from Irish ports 
 Only one policy taken in Glasgow for £10,00 at 5/0 
per Cent 
 Principal firms only inclined to quote from day to 
day. 
Manchester Nov 7th, 1914  No standard war risk available 
 A rate of 5/0 per Cent mentioned by brokers 
 Maximum policy duration one week 
 Mention of assuring coasting trade – Manchester to 
Scotland, Manchester to south coast 
 
Table 2 – Trade Store responses to query on war risks 
 
The rates shown in Table 2 are a per Cent rate (per £100 of insured product). As can be 
gleaned from the summarised responses, there was a level of uncertainty at this early stage of 
WW1, which may explain the willingness of Guinness to self-insure – perhaps envisaging the 
war as a short term event. The previously mentioned Board memorandum of November 5th 
also notes a current rate of 10/0 (50p) for insurance on hops, and 5/0 (25p) for malts. These 
rates, and the rates in Table 2, were presumably used to charge war risk costs from the 
proposed Fund. The memorandum notes that the above War Risk Insurance Fund be 
established unless Lord Iveagh objected – Lord Iveagh was copied on the memorandum and 
as revealed below, the account was opened in the company ledger. 
 
Shortly after, on November 18th 1915, J.A. Hayes (Chief Accountant, St. James’s Gate) 
reported to the Board of Directors on another war risk cost issue. Based on the introduction to 
this report, it seems Hayes was tasked with assessing whether or not the company should take 
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on the war risk on its steamers – this was mentioned in the Board memorandum of November 
5th as a possible future consideration. Hayes reported that the two steamers had a book value 
of £22,200, with the Carrowdore having a value of £16,100. The report also notes the values 
of cargo to the United Kingdom (full casks) and return cargo values (empty casks). In 
addition, this report provides evidence of a ‘normal’ Marine Risk insurance policy, and notes 
that “the Marine Risk is included in the charge made for freight” to customers. Hayes 
concludes in the report: 
 
In the event of it being decided to take over the War Risk insurance of our vessels, the 
suggested names of the Account in the Red Ledger […] might be “War Risk Marine 
Insurance.  
 
As noted by Quinn (2014), the Red Ledger was what we would today term a nominal ledger, 
and unfortunately no such ledgers are presently available at the archive. From later 
documents, it would appear that the decision was made to self-insure on the company 
steamers. A report dated 2nd December 1914 from C.E. Sutton (Asst. Managing Director) to 
J.A. Hayes (Chief Accountant) refers to the Board decision of November 5th to create the 
fund, and “that the amount of £30,000 be credited to this fund, with the intention that the 
company would take on the war risk of the Carrowdore and the W.M. Barkley”13. A later 
report from Hayes to Sutton dated 16th February 1915 provides evidence of transactions on 
the “War Risk Insurance Account”; malt, hops, porter, and the “hull and machinery” of 
company steamers are included in the total amount of £3,74014 – presumably using market-
based per Cent rates as described earlier (see Table 2). 
  
To summarise thus far, by February 1915 management at the St. James’s Gate Brewery had 
started to realise additional war risk costs on both transit of raw materials and finished goods 
to/from ports in the United Kingdom and goods in Trade Stores. Even at this early stage, the 
role of the accounting department was a key one, not only in providing costs and estimates, 
but also in tracking the total costs of war risk to the company. As the next section details, the 
role of accounting was to become more regularised, particularly in allocating the additional 
war risk costs to various parts of the company.  
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On-going (routinised) procedures 
As noted above, the Accounting Department was involved in recording and providing 
information on war risk to the business. New procedures which evolved around the Trade 
Stores in particular are now explored in some detail. 
 
On February 18th, 1915, C.E. Sutton issued a report titled “War Risk in connection with 
Trade Store consignments” to the Board, company secretary and company auditor15. 
Although Sutton had initiated contact with these stores in November 1914 (see previous 
section), it was this February report which initiated what was to become a more regular 
practice in terms of accounting for (and insuring) product at their stores. The report notes a 
discussion at Board level, and reflects on past events which may have affected Trade Stores: 
 
The entire question with regard to War Risk Insurance, both on our steamers and in 
respect of Beer in transit to our stores is a matter which it would be proposed should 
now be taken up again. It has been our practice, in order not to interfere with 
comparative store figures, to charge special strike accounts exceptional expenditure 
which has arisen during the period of labour troubles or other such contingencies, but 
this course has been adopted particularly in view of the fact that the troubles referred 
to have been of short duration. 
 
As noted by Dennison and MacDonagh (1998, p.144), Ireland was the subject of many 
transport strikes during the period 1911-1914. These strikes cost the company £80,000 (ibid) 
and resulted in the eventual purchase of the two steamers mentioned previously. It is 
presumed this is what Sutton is referring to in the above report – while there may have been a 
period of industrial unrest, the relative duration of any one strike was relatively short. For this 
reason, costs of strikes were absorbed into special strike accounts. The view on WW1 was 
different, as Sutton notes: 
 
The present European War it is felt raises perhaps an entirely different issue. The 
effects of war, so far as regards rates chargeable on Porter to our stores, whether 
“insured rates” or otherwise, is likely to continue for a very considerable period. The 
Secretary would be asked to take up with Mr Carnegie16 and Mr Hayes the question as 
to whether it would not be preferable to debit all these charges directly against the 
Stores in the same manner as for example, War Risk insurance on barley is at present 
being debited to the Malt Department. 
 
The above extract reveals a number of things. First, it reveals that internal re-charging of 
costs occurred – which in modern-day terms we might describe with terms such as cost object 
or cost centre. The files examined also revealed freight costs were allocated to Trade Stores 
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as a matter of course. Thus, even before WW1, Guinness traced freight costs to individual 
stores in the United Kingdom (see also, below). Second, the report reveals that a standard 
procedure had been established whereby costs of war risk insurance on barley were assigned 
directly to the Malt Department. Third, it reveals that the nature of the additional costs 
brought about by WW1 were viewed in a different manner to that which Sutton referred to as 
“other such contingencies”. The key differentiating factor, as noted in the above report 
extract was “the considerable duration”. The report continues with reference to additional 
freight costs to stores in Glasgow, Liverpool and London: 
 
So far as the question of war risk on our own boats is concerned we have to face the 
fact that in this case, for example, of Liverpool traffic we are not increasing the 
freight charge to the Store because the boat is our own, whereas in the case of London 
we are paying bonuses on the traffic carried, which is for all practical purposes and 
increase on freight costs; and that similarly we are paying increased freight on all our 
Scotch trade arising direct from the war. If our Glasgow Store is to be debited with 
increased charges owing to the freight being increased incident to the war, it would 
appear reasonable that Liverpool should be debited with the war risk on our ship in 
the form of increased freight charges to recoup the war risk paid. 
 
The above extract reveals there were inconsistencies in the internal allocation of war risk 
costs. The previous extract suggests a procedure had been established for additional costs on 
barley, but the above suggests differing treatment of costs according to which Trade Store 
goods were shipped to. The report concludes that such inconsistencies may have been 
problematic: 
 
[…] When owing to the war additional cost has to be incurred […] to enable us to 
place our beer in a position to be sold, and when the liability appears to be likely to 
continue for a considerable time, it would appear almost preferable that the Store 
itself should be debited with the cost, so that it may show relatively, from a 
geographical point of view, how each store is situated. 
 
 
This suggests that Guinness already traced the relative costs and performance of each of its 
Trade Stores, and as noted previously, traced costs to the Malt Department – see also Quinn 
(2014) where costs were also traced to the Cooperage. C.E. Sutton was of the view that this 
existing practice be extended to include the additional war risk costs. Sutton’s suggestions 
seem to have been implemented, based on an (unsigned) report17 to the company’s internal 
auditor dated April 6th 1915. The report, titled “War Risk Marine Insurance in connection 
with Stores consignments”, outlines how the additional war risk costs were accounted for as 
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previously mentioned. This April 6th report begins by referring to Suttons February 18th 1915 
report noting “we gather that the store is to be debited with its share” of the war risk marine 
insurance cost. It continues, noting that a total of £540 would be credited from the War Risk 
account and debited to the various stores. From this date, it appears that all potential war risk 
costs taken on by the brewery were first debited to the War Risk account and then 
subsequently charged out to various departments and each Trade Store. After this date, there 
are several examples of requests by accounting clerks as to the amounts to be debited to each 
department and on enquiries as to what insurance rate to use – the per Cent rate increased as 
the war progressed. For example, a memorandum for Accounting to the Managing Director 
dated April 11th 1917 quotes the rate on Malt at between 10/0 (50p) and 40/0 (£2.00) 
depending on the location. Finally, although Aircraft Risk was perhaps less of an issue in 
WW1, mention of it is also briefly noted in a separate (smaller) Aircraft Risk Insurance file. 
The risks here related specifically to London, and a report dated October 2nd 1915 notes that 
the company also self-insured against this risk and operated the same accounting procedure 
as noted above. In this case however, only the London store was debited with the additional 
costs. 
 
As the war progressed, based on the War Risk file, Guinness began to transfer some of the 
war risks to external insurers. For example, on June 8th 1915, the steamer W.M. Barkley was 
insured for £12,000, with a balance of £8,000 in “the Brewery books”. Similarly, on June 16th 
1915, a policy in the amount of £16,000 was taken out on the Carrowdore steamer, with 
£4,000 remaining “under the Brewery scheme”18. Later, on March 5th 1917, an invoice from 
Hobson, Allfrey and Wheeler notes £10,000 insurance on stout and casks between Dublin 
and Southampton/Plymouth. A stock valuation report dated April 4th 1917 in the War Risk 
file values stocks at UK Trade Stores at just under £105,000, with approximately £3,000 of 
this held at Southampton. A few weeks later, on May 8th 1917, a Board Endorsement (No. 
3933)19 noted that “[empty] casks in transit are to be covered against War Risk under the 
Company’s insurance scheme”. The endorsement notes that premiums were to be paid to the 
insurance company based on casks received in Dublin in the previous month. This implied 
the Cask Department had to produce a monthly report showing the quantity and value of 
empty casks by each UK Trade Store.  
 
In summary, WW1 increased the operating costs of Guinness through additional war risk 
costs. Some of these costs were assumed by the company itself through a special reserve 
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account, while others were passed to external insurers. The costs were charged to internal 
departments, to “see how each store is situated” as C.E. Sutton put it. This charging of costs 
was based on the existing cost accounting system, which it seems was easily adapted to 
generate a new set of management accounting practices. These practices were enacted 
throughout the WW1 years, with the War Risk Insurance file formally closed on March 1st, 
1921. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Before discussing the changes to management accounting (routines) revealed above, the 
general nature of accounting practices is worthy of brief mention. As Edwards and Boyns 
(2013) note, there is debate on the nature of cost accounting prior to WW1. In short, there is 
“not a broad consensus on the matter” (Edwards and Boyns, 2013, p. 187), with positive and 
negative views on the value and use of management accounting prior to WW1. While it is not 
the objective here to add substantially to this debate, the analysis of war risk accounting at 
Guinness has revealed some relatively complex management accounting practices, which can 
be summarised briefly as below – using present day terminology: 
 
 Indirect costs (such as war risk insurance costs) were traced to cost centres (Trade 
Stores). 
 Departmental performance was monitored/controlled, similar to a responsibility 
accounting system – e.g. comparisons of Trade Stores (see also, Quinn (2014) and the 
Cooperage). 
 Cost of capital was recognised – an inputted interest rate of 3% was charged on the 
“loan” to the War Risk Insurance Fund from general reserves. 
 
Guinness was a large, public company at that time with profits of approximately £1.5m 
during the WW1 period20. Thus, arguably more complex management accounting practices 
might be expected. However, the above does add in a small way to the aforementioned debate 
on the nature of management accounting pre-WW1. 
 
As noted earlier, organisational routines are drawn upon to explore change to management 
accounting at Guinness as a result of WW1. As revealed in the previous section, a “new” 
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management accounting practice at Guinness was the allocation of war risk costs. Using 
Pentland’s (2011) criteria, Table 3 shows this is a routine. The dynamics of routine formation 
has been widely discussed in the organisational literature, and having established accounting 
for war risk costs as a new management accounting routine, we can now begin to explore the 
effect of an external stimulus (WW1) on existing and new routines.  
 
The work of Feldman and Pentland (2003) is quite useful in our interpretation. As noted 
previously, they suggest two dimensions of routines, the ostensive and performative. They 
also note “people can use the ostensive aspect of routines progressively” (2003, p.105), 
implying new routines can be created from existing routines. While Feldman and Pentland 
(2003, pp. 111-114) refer more to endogenous change brought about through the on-going 
interactions of the ostensive/performative dimension of routines, they do not dismiss 
exogenous change. Based on the data revealed from Guinness, there would appear to be a 
complex melange of exogenous and endogenous change, and stability – which is now 
detailed. 
 
Routine criterion (Pentland, 
2011) 
Evidence  
Repetitive  Evidence of war risk cost allocation from 1914 on 
regular basis within the company ledgers (as 
referred to in Board memoranda in the previous 
section). 
Multiple actors  Managers, accounting staff, departmental staff. 
Recognisable pattern of action  Similar accounting entries made periodically and for 
each war risk cost type (risk on Malt, Barley, goods 
in transit, goods at Trade Stores). 
Interdependent  War risk costs agreed (by Managers for self-
insurance, or by cover (later) through brokers); costs 
allocated to departments based on some allocation 
method (e.g. value of inventory); performance of 
departments monitored (including the war risk cost). 
  
Table 3 – war risk costs as management accounting routines 
 
As noted by scholars such as Winter (2003) and Burns and Scapens (2000), change can be 
brought about by external shocks to organisations. Although referring to dynamic 
capabilities, Winter’s statement that “organisations often have to cope with problems they are 
not well prepared for” (2003, p.992) is a useful starting point in the story of new (and 
changed) management accounting routines at Guinness. WW1 was an event that businesses 
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could not have envisaged and they had to deal with additional costs, risks and restrictions. At 
Guinness, this exogenous event caused managers to consider the additional risk (and cost), 
and to account for this by setting up a War Risk Insurance Fund account in the company’s 
ledger i.e. creating new management accounting routines as per Table 3. 
 
However, an exogenous change driver is only the starting point, and here we can use the 
ostensive/performative dimensions of routines to explain changes to management accounting 
described earlier. Feldman and Pentland (2003) detail how ostensive (tacit) routines become 
performative (acting out) routines. Ostensive routines can be used in a guiding, accounting 
and referring manner to the acting out of a routine i.e. the performative routine (ibid p. 106). 
Guiding implies the ostensive routine can “serve as a template for behaviour” (ibid. p.106); 
accounting allows actors to explain what they are doing with reference to the ostensive 
routine; referring allows actors to use the ostensive routine to refer to patterns of action that 
otherwise may not be sensible e.g. allocating costs. In terms of the War Risk Insurance Fund, 
and subsequent cost allocations at Guinness, we can describe how new management 
accounting routines were formed: 
 
 An exogenous factor (WW1) prompted managers/accountants at Guinness to consider 
and account for new additional costs.   
 Existing management accounting routines were drawn upon by actors as a template to 
determine behaviour. The existing ostensive routines for tracing costs to 
departments/Trade Stores guided the formation of new ostensive routines. This is 
evidenced by various discussions in Board Memorandum as outlined earlier from 
September 1914 through to April 1915. 
 These new ostensive routines were acted out, i.e. a performative routine emerged 
from the discussions at Board level.  
 The new routine was formed, and meets the essential criteria of an organizational 
routine as set out in Table 3. 
 
This formation of a new management accounting routine highlights several interesting issues 
for contemporary research. First, it reveals how an exogenous event arguably brings about 
endogenous change to an existing organizational routine i.e. there is no new routine. This is 
eloquently summarised by Feldman and Pentland: “people combine elements of past 
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repertoires of a particular routine or actions from other sources to deal with present 
situations” (2003, p. 112). The changes to management accounting (accounting for additional 
war risk costs) could be described as an adaptation of an existing routine to new 
circumstances; as Feldman and Pentland note, routines can be created/ modified through 
acting out of the performative routine, whereby actors can through reflection choose 
variations of existing ostensive routines (pp. 107-108). This latter point – variations on 
existing ostensive routines – suggests change is endogenous. However, in terms of the war 
risk costs themselves, these costs are brought about by an exogenous factor, and thus, both 
exogenous and endogenous change to existing routines arguably occurs.  
 
Second, building on the first issue, the new management accounting routines reveal the 
entwined nature of change and stability – as Burns and Scapens note “change and stability are 
not independent - they are both simultaneously part of the same on-going processes” (2000, 
p.18). We could (and do here) state that new routines formed (Table 3) to account for war 
risk costs i.e. change to existing management accounting practices did occur due to WW1. 
However, we could also state that the existing management accounting routines remained 
quite stable, with some modifications to deal with new events i.e. no management accounting 
change occurred. This is similar to Quinn’s (2014) finding, where he suggests stability and 
change in management accounting routines can go hand-in-hand. Whether we should regard 
accounting for war risk costs at Guinness as change, stability or both reveals the complex 
nature of organisational routines. However, if we reflect on Pentland’s (2011) four criteria of 
organisational routines (see also, Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2010), we can 
say that there are similar patterns of action in cost allocation routines at Guinness. Costs were 
allocated to departments and Trade Stores before WW1, and this continued through the war – 
albeit with the addition of war risk costs. Thus, despite there being some variation due to the 
additional war risk costs, there is still a similar (not identical) basic pattern of action in the 
performance of cost allocation routines. Of course, as proposed in Table 3, we could also 
argue there are new routines which deal specifically with the additional war risk costs. 
Theoretically, the argument that the cost allocation routines had a varied but similar pattern 
of action due to WW1 is probably more correct if we refer to ‘cost allocation’ routines – at 
least drawing on the works of Pentland (2011) and Feldman and Pentland (2003). One 
possible solution, which presently does not have much empirical support21, is to consider 
routines as mechanisms with multiple levels as suggested by Vromen (2011). Here for 
example, we could consider “cost allocation” as a high level mechanism with many 
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component parts. Using this conceptualisation of routines, the war risk cost routines at 
Guinness could be a “new” component routine in the larger routine of cost allocation. 
However, the present study did not set out to specifically explore Vromen’s (2011) 
proposition but future historical and contemporary studies in this area may prove very 
fruitful. 
 
Third, accounting for war risk costs at Guinness suggests some routines may be quite 
versatile and adaptable, even when faced with new and large forces for change (such as 
WW1). Bapuji et al. (2012) suggest routines emerge from a human/non-human interaction 
which is enabled by intermediaries such as artefacts. They suggest routines can be termed 
“strong” if the intention of the routine is transmitted in a clear and unambiguous way through 
intermediaries. Such a strong routine is more likely to be repeated in a similar way over time. 
At Guinness, according to Quinn (2014) relatively complex ledgers were maintained well 
before incorporation in 1886. Thus, double entry accounting had been practised at the 
company for a considerable time before WW1. This application of the double entry system 
over time creates intermediaries (artefacts) i.e. ledgers and nominal accounts. Within any 
organisation, arguably these intermediaries combined with the rules of double entry create 
strong routines – routines which are repeated in a similar and expected way over time. Based 
on how Guinness changed its accounting to incorporate war risk costs – a new and highly 
unpredictable exogenous factor – we could argue that strong routines are not only strong as 
described by Bapuji et al. (2012), but also strong in that they are resilient and adaptable. As 
the evidence from Guinness shows, we could also argue based on Bapuji et al. (2012), that 
strong routines remain relatively stable (a similar pattern of action occurs, Pentland, 2011) 
even in the face of major external events22. Of course, as noted earlier change and stability go 
hand-in-hand and whether management routines at Guinness exhibited change, stability or 
both as a result of WW1, depends on our level analysis. However, as noted by Bapuji et al. 
“the benefits of routines accrue to organizations that have strong routines – not weak routines 
– in place” (2012, p. 1603). Before WW1 Guinness had in place a set of management 
accounting practices on allocating costs which were well understood, routinised and produced 
many artefacts (ledgers, reports etc). This, in Bapuji et al. (2012) terminology, is a strong 
routine – one which is easily understood, conveyed through artefacts and performed in a 
similar way over time. Thus, when a large external event such as WW1 presented some new 
cost types, the routine could be easily adapted. It could be argued that what we have 
presented here is another cost type and the response of Guinness was to be expected. 
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However, whether we argue the war risk cost accounting routines described here are new or 
adapted, the presence of the existing strong routine played a key role in how Guinness 
adapted its management accounting practices. In short, the strong cost allocation routines 
made the effects a non-routine event (WW1) routine. 
 
This study has some limitations. The primary limitation is it is a single case, with arguably a 
unique history in an Irish context. We cannot be certain that the practices found at Guinness 
were replicated in other Irish firms. Further research on industries which supplied the war 
effort directly may offer some confirmatory evidence – the linen industry in Belfast may be a 
fruitful source23. Second, although efforts have been made to thoroughly research the 
archives, we cannot be absolutely certain that we have captured the complete story of change 
in accounting practices due to WW1. Despite these limitations, it is hoped this study will 
encourage more research not only on the effects of key events in history on management 
accounting practices, but also encourage further research on organisational and management 
accounting routines using historical/archival data. Although not explored in great detail in the 
present research, artefacts24 such as archival records are often (as here) utilised to study 
organisational routines (D’Adderio, 2011). Such research may assist us in not only exploring 
the accounting history of organisations, but also in furthering our understanding of routines in 
contemporary settings – to paraphrase Pentland (2011, p.290) “empirical evidence [of 
routines] is relevant”. 
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1 Excise duty rates obtained from Excise Tariff of the United Kingdom – 1851/52 to 1959/60”, Customs 
Intelligence Branch, available at National Archives, Kew, London. 
2 Although the literature on management accounting change mentioned here is not typically historical, there are 
many published archival/historic studies of management accounting (some drawing on institutional theories) in 
contemporary literature - see for example, Jackson et al., (2012); Ogata and Spraakman, (2013); Quinn, (2014); 
Spraakman (2006).  
3 Burns and Scapens (2000) also include rules in their analysis of the processes of change. It is not intended here 
to provide an extensive discussion on Burns and Scapens’ work, but see Quinn (2014) for a more detailed 
discussion. 
4 Some literature adopts the term continuity as opposed to stability. We regard these terms are interchangeable.  
5 Two particularly important areas noted by Edward and Boyns (2013) are overhead allocation and uniform 
(standardised) costing. 
6 There is a relative paucity of literature on the alcoholic drinks industry, from in both an historical context and 
more generally. 
7 For a more detailed discussion on artefacts, see for example D’Adderio (2011). 
8 More information can be found at http://www.marine.ie/NR/exeres/C22BBD59-9B20-4FE9-B56B-
927A7BAC3405,frameless.htm, accessed September 23rd, 2013. 
9 Similarly, there were stores on the island of Ireland in Cork, Limerick, Galway, Ballinasloe, Carlow, Longford, 
and Carrick-on-Shannon. 
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10 This is the First Earl of Iveagh, Edward Cecil Guinness, who was Chairman of the Board and divided his time 
between Dublin and London. When in London, he was regularly updated on events by other members of the 
Board. 
11 It is presumed this telegraph, and the opening of a war risk file arose following the discussions with Lord 
Iveagh. 
12 2/6 is 2 shillings and 6 pence. A shilling was worth 12 old pence, and equates to 5 new pence. 
13 Following a German submarine raid in the Irish Sea in early 1916, a report dated February 2nd of that year 
notes the transfer of insurance to underwriters and cessation of the fund in the company ledger. 
14 This is a report authored by J. A. Hayes (Chief Accountant) and mentions transaction amounts. As noted, no 
ledgers have survived, but it is reasonable to assume that the report is a reflection of underlying ledger entries. 
15 This refers to an internal auditor. 
16 W.C. Carnegie, Audit Department. 
17 It is likely this report was authored by J.A. Hayes, the Chief Accountant. 
18 Later documentation dated March 30th 1917 shows that the value of insurance on the steamers which the 
company took on was charged to the Forwarding Department account in the ledgers – i.e. costs were allocated to 
departments as described previously. 
19 A Board Endorsement was used to communicate decisions made by the Board, where the original proposal 
was brought to the Board for consideration. 
20 Source, Annual Reports 1914-1918. 
21 Further research using Vromen’s (2011) work is to be encouraged. 
22 It should be noted that Bapuji et al. (2012) specifically studied the emergence of routines as either strong or 
weak. They did not explore what could be termed the resilience of strong routines over time. 
23 Oldham (1919) noted a very large increase in linen exports during the war period in comparison to the 
previous decade. Beer and whiskey exports in contrast remained stable over the same period. 
24 Artefacts are the “physical manifestation of the organizational routine” (Pentland and Feldman, 2008, p. 289). 
